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Chapter One: Literature Review
Introduction
Fraud and its Affects

Fraud has been an issue since the formation of businesses began. This includes
bribes, skimming money from the company, and stealing product; just to name a few
examples. Types of fraud are split into three categories: asset misappropriation,
financial statement fraud, and corruption. The main focus of this research will be on the
form of fraud known as asset misappropriation. (Associate of Certified Fraud
Examiners, 2012)

Because of the recent recession, fraud has increased more rapidly than ever
before. In 2009, “one in three companies around the world reported they were the
victims of business fraud during the past 12 months.” (Gillentine, 2009) This rate has
since increased, according to Kroll, 70% of companies are suffering from at least one
type of fraud in 2013. (Kroll, 2013) These statistics are from the fraud cases that have
been confirmed and reported. There are many instances where fraud will never be
caught and if it is, depending on the type of fraud committed, could take from one year
to three years to confirm.
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Asset misappropriation is the most common form of fraud, with approximately 86.7%
of fraud cases reported being a form of asset misappropriation. (Associate of Certified
Fraud Examiners, 2012) Why is this so much higher than the other two types of fraud?
This is because it is the easiest form of fraud to commit, with financial statement and
corruption usually involving multiple individuals and this makes it harder to conceal. The
relieving factor of asset misappropriation is that even though it is committed most often,
it has the lowest mean loss, $120,000 in 2012, compared to the other types of fraud.
With the average price of loss and the percentage of frequency, asset misappropriation
has cost companies more than $10 million. That is approximately $2 million more than
the next closest type of fraud, corruption. (Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners,
2012)

How People Commit Fraud

Originally there were thought to be three different factors contributing to a person
deciding to commit an act of fraud. These three factors are included in the Fraud
Triangle. The three different factors are pressure, opportunity, and rationalization.
Pressure is the motivation of the person to commit fraud, usually a financial burden.
Next is opportunity, which is the method by which the crime could be committed. Finally
is the rationalization, this is how the person justifies, in their own mind, committing the
crime. These factors were first defined by the criminologist Donald Cressey. (Fraud
Triangle, 2010) This research will not focus on the theory itself, but on the addition of a
fourth factor, capabilities.
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The Fraud Diamond is a new theory that adds a capabilities factor to the original
three. Authors David Wolfe and Dana Hermanson were the first people to propose this
fourth element in a 2004 CPA Journal article. (Wolfe & Hermanson, 2004) Capability is
a trait of the individual committing the fraud, which drives them to seek an opportunity
and exploit it. This brings in a factor other than the original environmental factors, now
considering behavioral predictors. (Hay, 2013)
Capabilities has six supporting traits: positioning, intelligence, ego, coercion,
deceit, and stress management. Fraudsters could have all six traits or any combination
of them. The first trait is positioning, which means that the individual is in a position not
available to others, allowing them to create or exploit an opportunity. Intelligence is that
the individual is creative and smart enough to understand and exploit the weakness to
their advantage. Ego means the fraudster has the confidence in their abilities to not be
caught. Next is coercion, where the individual can influence others to assist or conceal
the fraud that is occurring. Then deceit, the fraudster probably will be able to lie or divert
convincingly. Lastly there is stress management, committing and the ongoing
concealing of the fraud will cause continuous stress and, therefore, the fraudster can
appropriately manage the stress. (Hay, 2013)
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Contribution to the Literature
There has not been an extensive amount of research done on the aspects of the
capabilities of the fraud diamond. Since the capabilities trait came to light, most people
have just bypassed it and stuck with the original fraud triangle. What these people are
misunderstanding is that capabilities goes into depth of what it takes mentally to commit
fraud. With this understanding owners, managers, and any other employee can better
understand fraudsters and their traits. With this knowledge everyone could help prevent
fraud form occurring in their places of work.
In this research the objective is to perform a statistical analysis; by mapping the
capabilities attribute to the form of fraud known as asset misappropriation. The reason
for using asset misappropriation is the high amount of occurrences giving more cases to
use for statistical testing. Also, there are more ways of committing asset
misappropriation fraud than the other two forms; therefore there is a greater variety of
traits that will arise from the different cases.
The purpose of the statistical test is to determine if there is a significant
difference in the proportions of cases possessing each of between the six traits of
capabilities. If there is a difference, then employers and managers have criteria that
they can look for when evaluating current and prospective employees. With this they
can focus on the main contributing factors and even implement psychological testing to
identify these areas among potential employees, to further prevent fraud occurrences in
their organization.
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Chapter Two: Research
Methodology
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the fourth aspect of the fraud diamond,
capabilities, which is the newest manner to look at fraudsters’ traits. Within this
capabilities aspect this study is going to determine if there is a significant difference in
the prevalence of the six traits of capabilities. The data for this study came from two
sources, Donwycoff and Audit Executive Board. In contribution to this data the Ohio
Society of CPA’s website was used to analyze the data and put the fraud cases into
categories and map into the attributes of capabilities. Other sources were examined for
this purpose, but the same basic format and information was used as the Ohio Society
of CPA’s website. The Ohio Society had the most detail, therefore was the one used to
obtain the best analysis, also to avoid being redundant. This chapter discusses the
research design, hypotheses, population, research instrument, data collection, and data
analysis.

Research Design
The point of this study is to evaluate the capabilities aspect of the fraud diamond
for asset misappropriation. There will be 25 fraud cases mapped to the six traits of
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capabilities and a statistical analysis performed. The cases will be carefully mapped by
using extensive detail acquired about the six individual traits. After the cases are
carefully mapped, the statistical analysis will be performed on the preceding results.
The type of statistical analysis that is going to be performed is a Chi-squared
Test of the Equality of Proportions. This test analyzes categorical types of data and the
difference of more than two proportions, which fits the data set and parameters of this
study. This test is being performed on the mapping of the cases, to determine if there is
a significant difference in the presence of the six traits. After the test is conducted, if
there is a significant difference then further testing will have to be performed to
determine which trait or traits are significantly different.

Hypothesis
Hypothesis and Testing

Hypothesis 1: Is there a difference in the existence of the six factors?
Below is the hypothesis of the initial testing of the mapped fraud cases.

Ho: All proportions are equal.
(Ho: Π1=Π2=Π3=Π4=Π5=Π6)
Ha: At least one proportion is different.
Π1= the proportion of trait, Positioning
Π2= the proportion of trait, Intelligence
Π3= the proportion of trait, Ego
Π4= the proportion of trait, Coercion
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Π5= the proportion of trait, Deceit
Π6= the proportion of trait, Stress Management

For testing the proportions of the attributes the hypothesis above will be used. A Chisquared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used in deciding to reject or accept
the null hypothesis.

If the initial testing rejects the null, then additional testing will need to be performed
to acquire the appropriate results of this study. The hypothesis and testing procedures
are as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Which factors are different?
Ho: All individual attributes’ proportions are equal.
(Ho: Π1=Π2, Π1=Π3, Π1=Π4, Π1=Π5, Π1=Π6, Π2=Π3, Π2=Π4, Π2=Π5, Π2=Π6,
Π3=Π4, Π3=Π5, Π3=Π6, Π4=Π5, Π4=Π6, Π5=Π6)
Ha: At least one individual attributes’ proportions are different.

The testing of individual proportions will be conducted by the Marascuilo
Procedure. The results will show which individual attributes’ proportions are
significantly different.

Population
Fraud is being committed every day, but is not caught nearly as often as it is
committed. The population for this research, therefore, is based on a small portion of
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the asset misappropriation cases that have been caught, and are available to the public.
The reason for more cases not being available to the public is the private nature of the
matters, legality of the fraud cases, or the high cost of obtaining more cases.
For the purposes of this study, the cases used provided a sufficient number for
testing. Also, the cases provided necessary details to create maps on the individual
attributes of the capabilities aspect.

Data Collection
The data used in this study is strictly secondary data, provided by multiple sources,
Donwycoff and Audit Executive Board. Donwycoff is an individual who has worked in
the accounting field for 25 years and currently holds licensures including: CMA, CIA,
and CFE. Donwycoff conducts independent studies and surveys of companies and then
relays the data to the public for their awareness. The Audit Executive Board is an
accredited agency that many companies subscribe to for updates in the audit field of
accounting. It also provides results of fraud studies to these companies for their
knowledge and use.

Data Analysis
For testing the hypotheses stated above, in regards to the six traits of the
capabilities aspect, a Chi-squared Test of the Equality of Proportions will be used. This
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test was selected because this study’s goal is to see if there is one, or more, trait that is
more or less significant to companies when evaluating employees and potential hires.
The data used for the testing is categorical. That is the data, cases, are put into
categories for the purpose of the testing. The data will be put into a contingency table
for easy comparison between the individual attributes and the total occurrences. The
cases will be mapped to the six attributes of capabilities in the contingency table.

Conclusions
Chapter Two describes the research methodology used to evaluate the six
attributes of the capabilities aspect of the fraud diamond. The research design,
hypotheses, population, research instrument, data collection methods, and data
analysis measures relating to this study have been discussed preceding this conclusion.
The following chapter will present study results and details about these results.
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Chapter Three: Research Results
The research results are based on statistical testing done on 25 fraud cases.
These fraud cases were mapped to the six attributes of capabilities. This was done with
details about the attributes provided through Ohio Society of CPA’s website and the
information that came along with the cases from the sources: Donwycoff and Audit
Executive Board.

Testing of Mapped Cases
This study seeks to evaluate the six attributes of capabilities using real fraud
cases of asset misappropriation. The literature around fraud stated that asset
misappropriation is the most often committed form of fraud. Also, that there haven’t
been many studies conducted into the attributes of capabilities, therefore this study is
trying to depict if there are significant differences of occurrences of the attributes. In
doing this, it should allow employers to better understand a person’s ability or lack
thereof to commit fraud.
To evaluate the attributes on the mapped cases, Chi-Squared tests were
conducted. For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality of proportions
was used. The results of the testing of the mapped cases, Table 1, by using a
significance level of 0.05, a p-value of 0, having a critical value of 11.07, and the
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calculated test statistic of 14.679. This concluded in the null hypothesis being rejected
meaning that there are differences in the prevalence of the six attributes.

Table 1: Summary Results of Mapped Cases*
Chi-Squared Test for Equality of Proportions
Critical Value: 11.07
X2 Test Statistic: 14.677924528
P-Value: 0
Decision: Reject the null Hypothesis

*The full testing of the mapped attributes and the results are located in Appendix 4.

The second step of testing consists of determining which of the attributes occur
more or less commonly. This is done by testing each attribute against all others.

Testing of Individual Attributes
To test if there are differences between individual attributes, additional tests were
performed. These tests were performed on each attribute being paired with another
attribute until all attributes have been paired with one another. Then the Marascuilo
Procedure was run to determine what attributes are different from each other.
The summary of the 15 tests are listed in Table 2. For the full look at the testing
and its results, refer to Appendix 5.
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Table 2: Summary of Individual Attribute Testing
Attributes
Compared
Positioning Vs.
Intelligence
Positioning Vs.
Ego
Positioning Vs.
Coercion
Positioning Vs.
Deceit
Positioning Vs.
Stress Management
Intelligence Vs.
Ego
Intelligence Vs.
Coercion
Intelligence Vs.
Deceit
Intelligence Vs.
Stress Management
Ego Vs.
Coercion
Ego Vs.
Deceit
Ego Vs.
Stress Management
Coercion Vs.
Deceit
Coercion Vs.
Stress Management
Deceit Vs.
Stress Management

Critical
Value

Test Statistic
(Difference in
Proportions)

0.435744

0.2

0.284195

0.24

Decision

Accept
Accept
Reject
0.401912

0.52

0.284195

0.24

Accept
Accept
0.420856

0.08

0.330312

0.44

0.435744

0.32

0.330312

0.44

0.453276

0.12

0.284195

0.76

0

0

0.310408

0.32

0.284195

0.76

Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Accept
Reject
Reject
Reject
0.420856

0.44

0.310408

0.32

Reject

To evaluate the individual attributes, the Marascuilo Procedure was conducted
on the paired attributes. For testing the null hypothesis, a Chi-squared test for equality
of proportions was used. The testing used a significance level of 0.05; this is the same
as the initial Chi-square test. The critical value from initial hypothesis test was used to
calculate the critical value for this individual pairs in the Marascuilo Procedure.
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As the summary depicts above, out of the 15 tests, there were eight rejections of
the null hypothesis. In these rejections four out of the eight had the attribute, coercion.
The results show that coercion is statistically different from the other attributes, with the
exception of intelligence. The other four rejections consisted of stress management and
intelligence being statistically different when paired with ego and deceit. Table 3 shows
a summary of the rejections.

Table 3: Summary of Rejections
Attributes
Compared

First attribute’s
Proportion

Second Attribute’s
Proportion

Test Statistic
(Difference in
Proportions)
.52

Positioning Vs.
Coercion

.76

.24

Intelligence Vs.
Ego

.56

1

.44

Intelligence Vs.
Deceit

.56

1

.44

Ego Vs.
Coercion

1

.24

.76

Ego Vs.
Stress Management
Coercion Vs.
Deceit
Coercion Vs.
Stress Management
Deceit Vs.
Stress Management

1

.68

.32

.24

1

.76

.24

.68

.44

1

.68

.32
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Chapter Four: Conclusions and
Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to take the new aspect of a fraudster from the
fraud diamond, capabilities, and evaluate the attributes that composes it. This was
achieved through examining, mapping, and testing the asset misappropriation fraud
cases accumulated for this study. The testing for this study was to determine whether
there were significant differences among the attributes of capabilities.
Two stages of testing had to be performed in this study; one to determine if there
was a significant difference among the six different attributes and the second was to
determine which attributes were significantly different. The first test consisted of taking
the mapped cases to the attributes and testing the total occurrences. Because this test
rejected the null, the second stage of testing was performed. The Marascuilo Procedure
was performed to determine which attributes where significantly different from the
others.

Conclusion
The research showed that there is a significant difference in the attributes of
capabilities in the 25 fraud cases represented. There were a variety of different values
for each attribute category, which caused the significant difference. This range spanned
from the least with six occurrences in coercion, to the high of 25 for both ego and deceit.
This first stage of testing does not show which attributes are significant from the others.
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The significant difference from the first stage of testing forced an additional stage
of testing. This stage of the Marascuilo Procedure was to test the individual attributes
compared to one another to further determine the significant attribute or attributes. In
conclusion, eight of the tests did reject the null hypothesis: positioning versus coercion,
intelligence versus ego, intelligence versus deceit, ego versus coercion, ego versus
stress management, coercion versus deceit, coercion versus stress management, and
deceit versus stress management.
The rejections occurred because of the difference of the proportions of the
paired attributes. These proportions are based on the occurrences divided by the
number of possible occurrence for each attribute. These results show that there are
significant differences between the attributes, where coercion occurred most but was
not the only one that occurred multiple times. Therefore the other factors are significant
as well.

Recommendations
There are several recommendations that can be drawn related to these aspects
of capabilities. The first is directly related to the results of the testing. Coercion may
have occurred significantly less than the other attributes, but that does not mean that it
is not any less important than the others. In fact, it may be more important to put more
focus on this attribute. Coercion actually costs companies more than double, than if a
person were to commit fraud alone. In 2012 the median loss for an individual person
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committing fraud was $100,000, compared to fraud being committed with coercion with
multiple perpetrators, $250,000. (Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)
In addition to the capabilities, these recommendations also apply to all the other
rejected attributes. Whereas the other attributes are more emotional factors, they may
not seem to be addressed but they are. With all these recommendations they will
directly help deter the fraud from occurring or help identify the attributes in a person.

Internal Controls

The coercion attribute can be incredibly hard to detect if the right internal controls
are not in place. Even if there are controls, coercion between the right people can
override them. Therefore, companies have to be extremely careful with their internal
controls. One major internal control that benefits companies by deterring coercion is job
rotation or mandatory vacation for all employees. With this control in place there is
approximately a 62.5% reduction in the duration of fraud committed and a 33%
reduction in the loss compared to not having this control in place. Another angle to look
at it is instead of the fraud being committed for 24 months it only occurred 9 months and
it only cost the company $100,000 compared to $150,000. (Associate of Certified Fraud
Examiners, 2012)
For larger companies these amounts don’t affect them as much, but for smaller
companies these amounts could threaten their survival. Also, it is more likely that a
large company already has these controls in place where as a small one may not. This
increases their susceptibility of the fraud occurring in their organization. Another form of
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internal control that may be easier and more beneficial for smaller companies is
management review.
The internal control of management review is probably more applicable for a
small business, because in small businesses the manger could very well also be the
owner. This entails a greater liability and loss from the effects of fraud being committed
in their business. In turn having this high level internal control can reduce the loss by
about 46% and cut the duration of fraud down to 14 months instead of 24. (Associate of
Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)
These are just two examples of internal controls that can deter coercion and
overall fraud being committed, but there are many others that could be implemented
into companies. Just to name a few controls that companies could implement: tip
hotlines, fraud training, and an internal audit function. All have their costs and benefits,
and the benefits should outweigh the costs. Just as an illustration, if it takes $100,000 to
implement the control but it prevents $500,000 worth of fraud it would be worth it. That
is just hypothetical and no one could say for sure how effective an internal control will
be.
Effective internal controls will help prevent and or catch fraud, no matter what
attribute you are looking at. If the person is in the right position but is rotated to new
position every few years or management review of their work, it will be extremely hard
for them to commit the fraud. It is the same with the other attributes, it won’t matter how
big a person’s ego, how intelligent, managing stress, or their deceiving abilities,
effective internal controls should prevent the occurrence of fraud.
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Pre-employment tests

In addition of internal controls being added to a company, another suggestion is
to give prospective employees pre-employment tests. Most pre-employment tests that a
company can buy have multiple parts, such as evaluating the skills and aptitude in
addition to an individual’s personality. For the purpose of this research, the suggestion
is about the personality aspect of the tests.
The idea for this suggestion is to concentrate on the attributes of capabilities, to
identify people with high risk of fraud committing capabilities. With the results of the
pre-employment test a manager could then compare all the candidates for a position not
only on education and experience, but also on their fraud committing potential. To
further expound, if two candidates are almost exactly equal but one is a higher risk, the
manager may choose the candidate with the lower risk. If a candidate with the high risk
results is chosen for the position, then the manager is aware of the potential fraud
based on the personality test. With this knowledge the manager could better monitor the
individual, which managers should do for all employees, and ensure the person’s duties
and responsibilities are rotated on a timely basis and ensure the mandatory vacation
time is taken.
Some companies will be hesitant to start pre-employment testing because of the
cost. The prices of these tests aren’t readily available. No manager wants to spend
more money than is necessary. Pre-employment test providers charge two different
ways; they charge by each test provided or by a subscription based on how many tests
will be needed in a year.
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Recommendations for Future Research

The study of the capabilities aspect could be better evaluated with a larger data
set. Although these 25 cases were sufficient, the more data, the better the results will
be. The additional cases are available, but they can be costly to obtain. If additional
research is done around this topic, all data should be updated to the most current
information available.
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Appendix:
Appendix 1- Comparison of costs of Fraud in 2012
Type of Fraud
Percent of cases*
Mean cost
Total cost for 2012

Asset
Misappropriation
86.7%
$120,000
$10,404,000

Financial Statement
Fraud
7.6%
$1,000,000
$7,600,000

Corruption
33.4%
$250,000
$8,350,000

*Cases equal more than 100% because of multiple types of fraud being committed in the
same case.
(Associate of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2012)

Page 22 of 29

Appendix 2: List of Fraud Cases
Corresponding
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Fraud Title
Ghost Card
Gift Card
Purchasing card
Payroll file changes
Manipulating P.O.'s
Pocketing Maintenance
Fees
"Accidental"
Overpayments
Cashing In
Stealing Incentives
Land Purchases
Recruiter Fees
Weak Inventory Controls
Shipping Labels
Productivity Figures
Benefits System
Side Business
Baierl Acura
Receiving a Gratuity
Church Point Housing
San Jose Police Officers
Payroll Fraud
San Mateo Com. College
Giants P/R Manager
Auto Parts
Manufacturers
Campaign Treasury
Fraud

(Donwycoff, 2014) (Corporate Executive Board, 2014)
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Appendix 3: Fraud Cases Mapped to Capabilities’ Attributes

Positioning
3. Purchasing Card
4. Payroll file
changes
6. Pocketing
Maintenance Fees

Intelligence
2. Gift Card
4. Payroll file
changes
9. Stealing
Incentives

7. "Accidental"

10. Land Purchases

8. Cashing In
9. Stealing
Incentives

11. Recruiter Fees

11. Recruiter Fees

13. Shipping Labels
14. Productivity
Figures

12. Weak Inventory
14. Productivity
Figures

15. Benefits System

15. Benefits System
16. Side Business

17. Baierl Acura
19. Church Point

17. Baierl Acura
18. Receiving
Gratuity
19. Church Point

Ego
1. Ghost Card
2. Gift Card
3. Purchasing Card
4. Payroll file
changes
5. Manipulating
P.O.'s
6. Pocketing
Maintenance Fees
7. "Accidental"
Overpayments

Coercion
10. Land Purchases
14. Productivity
Figures
18. Receiving a
Gratuity
19. Church Point
Housing
22. San Mateo
Com. College
24. Auto Parts
Manufacturers

Deceit
1. Ghost Card
2. Gift Card
3. Purchasing Card
4. Payroll file
changes
5. Manipulating
P.O.'s
6. Pocketing
Maintenance Fees
7. "Accidental"
Overpayments

8. Cashing In
9. Stealing
Incentives

8. Cashing In
9. Stealing
Incentives

21. Payroll Fraud

10. Land Purchases
11. Recruiter Fees
12. Weak Inventory
Controls

10. Land Purchases
11. Recruiter Fees
12. Weak Inventory
Controls

24. Auto Parts
25. Campaign

13. Shipping Labels
14. Productivity

13. Shipping Labels
14. Productivity

20. San Jose Police

15. Benefits System

15. Benefits System

21. Payroll Fraud
22. San Mateo
23. Giants P/R
Manager
25. Campaign

16. Side Business
17. Baierl Acura
18. Receiving a
Gratuity
19. Church Point
20. San Jose Police
Officers
21. Payroll Fraud
22. San Mateo
23. Giants P/R
24. Auto Parts
25. Campaign

16. Side Business
17. Baierl Acura
18. Receiving a
Gratuity
19. Church Point
20. San Jose Police
Officers
21. Payroll Fraud
22. San Mateo
23. Giants P/R
24. Auto Parts
25. Campaign

16. Side Business
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Stress
management
3. Purchasing Card
4. Payroll file
changes
6. Pocketing
Maintenance Fees
7. "Accidental"
Overpayments
8. Cashing In
9. Stealing
Incentives
11. Recruiter Fees
12. Weak Inventory
Controls
13. Shipping Labels
14. Productivity
Figures
15. Benefits System
16. Side Business
17. Baierl Acura
19. Church Point
23. Giants P/R
Manager
24. Auto Parts
Manufacturers
25. Campaign

Appendix 4: Initial Chi2 Test Results
Fraud Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Total
Occurrences

Positioning

Intelligence

Ego

1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

19

14

25

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

Coercion

1

1

1
1

1
1

6

Deceit
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
25

Stress
Management

1
1
1

Total
occurrences
2
3
4
5
2
4
4
4
5
4
5
4
4
6
5
5
5
4
6
3
4
4
4
5
5

17

106

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Title
Total
Occurrences
Expected
Difference
Individual TS

Total Test
Statistic
19
17.667
1.333
0.1006

14
17.667
-3.667
0.7610

25
17.667
7.333
3.0440

6
17.667
-11.667
7.7044

25
17.667
7.333
3.0440

Data and Results
Significance Level
DF
Critical Value
Test Statistic
P-Value

5%
5
11.07
14.679
0
Reject the null hypothesis
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17
17.667
-0.667
0.0252

14.67924528

Appendix 5: Secondary Chi2 Test Results
Pos Vs Int
Positioning
Intelligence
Difference

Proprtions
0.76
0.56
0.2

Pos VS EGO
Positioning
Ego
Difference

Actual
0.76
1
0.24

Pos VS Coer
Positioning
Coercion
Difference

Actual
0.76
0.24
0.52

Pos VS Deceit
Positioning
Deceit
Difference

Actual
0.76
1
0.24

Pos VS SM
Positioning
Stress
Management
Difference

Actual
0.76

Int VS Ego
Intelligence
Ego
Difference

Actual
0.56
1
0.44

Int VS Coer
Intelligence
Coercion
Totals

Actual
0.56
0.24
0.32

0.68
0.08

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.435743778

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.284194863

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.401912229

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.284194863

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.42085627

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.330311853

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.435743778

Accept
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Int VS Deceit
Intelligence
Deceit
Difference

Actual
0.56
1
0.44

Int VS SM
Intelligence
Stress
Management
Difference

Actual
0.56

Ego VS Coer
Ego
Coercion
Difference

Actual
1
0.24
0.76

Ego VS Deceit
Ego
Deceit
Difference

Actual
1
1
0

0.68
0.12

Ego VS SM
Ego
Stress
Management
Difference

Actual
1

Coer VS Deceit
Coercion
Deceit
Difference

Actual
0.24
1
0.76

Coer VS SM
Coercion
Stress
Management

Actual
0.24

0.68
0.32

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.330311853

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.453276075

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.284194863

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0

Accept

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.310408247

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.284194863

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.68
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Difference

Deceit VS SM
Deceit
Stress
Management
Difference

0.44

Actual
1
0.68
0.32

0.42085627

Reject

Critical Value
calculated

Decision

0.310408247

Reject
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Appendix 6: Critical Value Chart
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